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DEMISE OF THE SEIDER DOCTRINE
In Rush v. Savchuk, the Supreme Court struck down the
controversial Seider doctrine, which permitted a state to
exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant solely on
the basis of his insurer doing business in that state. This
Comment analyzes the development of in personam and quasi
in rem jurisdiction and the constitutional principles that led
to the Rush decision. The author concludes, in light of Rush,
that direct action statutes against insurers would not with-
stand constitutional attack in cases in which the controversy
at issue occurred outside the forum state and the tortfeasor
was not otherwise subject to that state's jurisdiction.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its decision in Pennoyer v. Neff over a century ago, the
United States Supreme Court has held that the ability of state courts
to enter judgments affecting rights or interests of nonresident
defendants is limited by the operation of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.' Just where the line of limitation falls,
however, has been the subject of fertile controversy.3 Over the years,
the Court has articulated guidelines in an attempt to give content to
this amorphous restriction on state court jurisdiction. International
Shoe Co. v. Washington4 finally established the minimum contacts
standard which has become the foundation of modern jurisdictional
analysis. In that case, the Court held that a state's in personam
jurisdiction may extend to nonresidents who have sufficient contacts
with the state so that adjudication of a controversy in that forum is
1. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
2. See, e.g., Kulko v. California Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Wuchter v.
Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916); Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215
(1905).
3. The source of the controversy lies in defining the relationship that must exist
between the forum state and the litigants. See J. McCoID, CIVIL PROCEDURE
498-99 (1974). It is undisputed, however, that authority to render binding
judgments requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id.
4. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
5. "A judgment in personam imposes a personal liability or obligation on one
person in favor of another." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958)(citing RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, Introductory Note, at 5 (1942)).
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fair and reasonable.' More recently, Shaffer v. Heitner7 extended that
concept and held that jurisdiction in rem and quasi in rem8 must
conform to the same standard of fairness that International Shoe
established for in personam jurisdiction.9
Shaffer eliminated much of the inconsistency and confusion that
had arisen as a result of applying different rules to different types of
jurisdiction. It was not immediately apparent, however, just what
effect Shaffer had on the controversial theory espoused in Seider v.
Roth,10 which permitted a state to exercise jurisdiction over a
nonresident on the basis of his insurance carrier's doing business in
that forum. Recently, the Court considered the Seider doctrine in
Rush v. Savchuk" and, relying on Shaffer, declared the doctrine
unconstitutional as applied to a defendant whose only contact with
the forum state is the "affiliating circumstance" of his liability
insurer's doing business there."
This comment examines the constitutional principles that led to
the demise of the Seider doctrine. It then examines the implications
of the Court's decision in Rush, particularly with respect to the
viability of direct actions against insurers in cases in which, despite
the plaintiff's residence in the forum and the insurer's doing
business there, no relationship exists between the underlying cause
of action and the forum state.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
Historically, the adjudicatory authority of a tribunal was said to
be grounded on its de facto power over persons or property located
within its borders."3 Under this power-presence concept," first given
6. 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
7. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
8. A judgment in rem affects the interest of all persons in designated property. A
judgment quasi in rem affects the interest of particular persons in designated
property. The latter is of two types. In Type I, the plaintiff is seeking to secure
a pre-existing claim in the subject property and to extinguish or establish the
nonexistence of similar interests of particular persons. In Type II, the plaintiff
seeks to apply what he concedes to be property of the defendant to the
satisfaction of a claim against the defendant. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
246 n.12 (1958). Hereinafter quasi in rem will be used in reference to Type II.
9. 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977).
10. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
11. 100 S. Ct. 571 (1980).
12. Id. at 580.
13. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
14. For a discussion of the power-presence theory of Pennoyer, see Ehrenzweig, The
Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum
Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956).
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constitutional stature in Pennoyer,5 jurisdiction in personam could
be exercised only when the defendant was physically present in the
forum state and was served with process there.6 Similarly, jurisdic-
tion in rem and quasi in rem required that the property of the
defendant be located within the territorial boundaries of the forum
and that it be brought before the court by attachment. 7 Any attempt
to exercise judicial authority beyond territorial limits was regarded
as an illegitimate assumption of power.'
A. In Personam Jurisdiction
Gradually, the exigencies created by multistate corporate
growth and the increased mobility of society in general came into
conflict with the rigid analytical strictures of Pennoyer.5 Recogniz-
ing the need for an expanded view of state jurisdiction, yet
constrained by stare decisis, the Court first resorted to legal fictions
in an effort to permit states to widen the scope of their adjudicatory
authority and meet the practical demands of the twentieth century.
For example, foreign corporations doing business in a state2° and
nonresident motorists who made use of a state's highways2' were
held to have impliedly consented to the jurisdiction of the state with
regard to causes of action arising from those activities. Personal
15. Pennoyer was the first case to apply the due process clause to personal
jurisdiction. The test arrived at and the language used, however, were virtually
identical to that of D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850), cited in
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720, 729 (1877). The D'Arcy decision was prior to
passage of the fourteenth amendment. In that case the Court found the concept
of reciprocal restraints on the states' sovereignty to be embodied in the full
faith and credit clause. 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 174-76. See Comment, Long-Arm
and Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and the Fundamental Test of Fairness, 69 MICH.
L. REV. 300, 303-05 (1970).
16. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877). Personal service in the state was
seen as both a necessary and sufficient condition for the exercise of in personamjurisdiction. Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner: An End to Ambivalence in Jurisdic-
tional Theory, 26 U. KAN. L. REV. 61 (1978).
17. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
18. Id. at 722-23.
19. See Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam
Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569, 575-86 (1958); Note,
Developments in the Law - State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909,
919-23 (1960).
20. See, e.g., Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855). Originally,
jurisdiction over corporations was thought to be confined exclusively to the
state of incorporation; the idea being that the corporation could not legally
exist elsewhere. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
This, however, did not prevent a corporation from engaging in activities in
other states, and those interstate activities demanded an extension of
jurisdiction which came even before Pennoyer. The solution was found in the
theory of implied consent which repeatedly has been a tool for expanding
jurisdiction. J. McCoID, CIVIL PROCEDURE 510 (1974).
21. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
1980]
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jurisdiction over foreign corporations was also sustained on the
premise that the corporation could be treated as "present" in the
forum if it conducted a sufficient quantum of business there.22
International Shoe Co. v. Washington" marked a major adjust-
ment in personal jurisdiction analysis. Rejecting Pennoyer's premise
that "presence" was the touchstone of judicial jurisdiction, Interna-
tional Shoe delineated a new test to permit states to exercise in
personam jurisdiction beyond their territorial boundaries. At issue
in International Shoe was whether the State of Washington could sue
a Missouri-based Delaware corporation in Washington to collect an
employment tax. The corporation employed several salesmen in
Washington whose only activity on behalf of the corporation was the
solicitation of orders. Although such activity, by itself, previously
had been held not to constitute such "doing business" as would
expose the corporation to personal jurisdiction,24 the Court held that
Washington was a proper forum. Rather than focusing upon a state's
physical power over the defendant, International Shoe stated that
the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant has certain "minimum
contacts" with the forum state "such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' ",25 Factors considered by the Court in reaching the conclu-
sion that Washington's exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident
corporation comported with notions of fairness included the degree of
inconvenience to the defendant in defending an action away from
home, the systematic and continuous nature of the contacts, and the
relationship between the lawsuit and the defendant's activities in
the forum state.26 The Court stressed that these factors cannot be
assessed in a mechanical or quantitative fashion: "Whether due
process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature
of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of
the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to
insure. ' 27 To the extent that a defendant enjoys the benefits and
protections of state laws by conducting activities within that state,
requiring him to enter the forum to defend his activity is not
unfair.28
22. The corporate presence fiction was articulated by Justice Brandeis: "A foreign
corporation is amenable to process to enforce a personal liability, in the absence
of consent, only if it is doing business within the state in such a manner and to
such extent as to warrant the inference that it is present there." Philadelphia
& Reading Ry. v. McKibben, 243 U.S. 264 (1917).
23. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
24. See International Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
25. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
26. 326 U.S. 310, 317, 320 (1945).
27. Id. at 319.
28. Id.
414 [Vol. 9
19801 State Court Jurisdiction
Expanding the principles set forth in International Shoe, the
Court, in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,2" sustained a
California court's exercise of in personam jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant whose only contact with the forum was its
offer to insure one California resident and its acceptance of
premiums mailed from that state. 0 In support of its conclusion that
due process requirements were satisfied in McGee, the Court
emphasized that the suit was based on a contract which had a
"substantial connection with that State,"3 and that California had a
legitimate interest in regulating insurers who solicited business
there.32
In McGee, the Court indicated a willingness to permit exercises
of jurisdiction based upon increasingly minimal contacts, noting that
there was a trend toward expanding the scope of jurisdiction over
nonresidents. One year later, however, Hanson v. Denckla3 made it
clear that McGee did not herald the demise of all restrictions on the
personal jurisdiction of state courts.Y In Hanson, a Florida court had
attempted to assert jurisdiction over a Delaware trustee primarily
because the settlor of the trust was domiciled in Florida.' Despite
correspondence between the nonresident trustee and the settlor
while the latter was in Florida, the Court concluded that Florida was
without jurisdiction. In order to fulfill the minimum contacts test set
29. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
30. In McGee, a Texas insurance company took over the policies of another insurer.
The Texas company then solicited a reinsurance agreement with a California
resident who had been insured by the previous company. The California
resident accepted the new offer and from that time until his death paid
premiums by mail from his home. The insured's beneficiary filed a claim
following his death. When the insurer refused to pay, suit was brought in
California based upon a statute (CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1610-1620 (West 1972))
subjecting foreign insurance corporations to suit on insurance contracts with
residents of California. The case reached the United States Supreme Court
after a Texas court refused full faith and credit to the California judgment. 355
U.S. 220, 221-22 (1957).
31. Id. at 223. "The insurance agreement was delivered in California, the
premiums were mailed from there and the insured was a resident of that state
when he died." Id.
32. Id.; see CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1610-1620 (West 1972).
33. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
34. Id. at 251.
35. The settlor had established the trust in Delaware before becoming a Florida
resident. Once in Florida, however, she continued to exercise control over the
trust by sending specific instructions to the trustee. Upon the settlor's death,
her estate was probated in Florida. Florida attempted to obtain jurisdiction
over all indispensable parties, including the Delaware trustee. The question
before the United States Supreme Court was whether Florida, consistent with
due process, could exercise jurisdiction over the trustee. Other than the
trustee's correspondence with the settlor in Florida, there were no alleged
contacts between the trustee and the state. The Court held that the
correspondence alone was insufficient to satisfy the minimum contacts test. Id.
at 238-39, 253.
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forth in International Shoe, the Court declared, "it is essential in
each case that there be some act by which the defendant purpose-
fully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the
forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.
36
B. Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction
Despite substantial modification of the constitutional standard
of in personam jurisdiction, the status of quasi in rem jurisdiction
remained static for nearly a century after Pennoyer. A plaintiff
seeking a judgment against a defendant who did not have the
requisite contacts with the forum to support in personam jurisdiction
could proceed quasi in rem, attaching for jurisdictional purposes any
property of the defendant that was located within the forum state.37
The state court could thus obtain jurisdiction over the defendant up
to an amount equal to the value of the property attached and a
successful claim by a plaintiff could be satisfied with the proceeds of
such property. Significant in the development of quasi in rem
jurisdiction is Harris v. Balk. 8 In that case, Epstein, a Maryland
resident, was owed money by Balk, a North Carolina resident.
Harris, also a resident of North Carolina, owed money to Balk.
While Harris was temporarily in Maryland, Epstein attached Harris'
debt to Balk, obtained a judgment against Balk, and satisfied the
judgment with the Harris debt. The Supreme Court ruled that the
debt followed the debtor (Harris) wherever he went.39 Because a state
was deemed to have exclusive jurisdiction over any property found
within its territory, 40 quasi in rem jurisdiction over the creditor
(Balk) was established by attaching the debt when the debtor was in
the forum state. Harris remained an accurate reflection of the scope
of quasi in rem jurisdiction until the Court's recent pronouncement
in Shaffer v. Heitner.4
C. The Shaffer Standard
As the rules governing quasi in rem and in personam jurisdic-
tion evolved independently of each other, the inherent unfairness of
proceedings typified by Harris became increasingly difficult to
reconcile with the Court's growing emphasis upon "fair play and
36. Id. at 253.
37. See Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316 (1890).
38. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
39. Id. at 222.
40. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
41. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). Although Harris dates from 1905, its vitality was
recognized in New York in 1966 when that state's court decided Seider v. Roth,




substantial justice 42 in the area of in personam jurisdiction. In
Shaffer,4 the Court eliminated this problem and declared that "all
assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to
the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.""
Recognizing that the assertion of jurisdiction over property is, in
reality, the assertion of jurisdiction over its owner," the Court held
that the mere presence of property in a state does not establish a
sufficient nexus between its owner and the state to support the
exercise of jurisdiction when the cause of action is unrelated to that
property.46 While the ownership of property in a state may suggest
the presence of other ties,47 jurisdiction is lacking unless there are
sufficient contacts among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation to satisfy the fairness standard of International Shoe.48
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SEIDER DOCTRINE
One of the earliest results of the Court's decision in Shaffer was
a renewed attack on the vitality of the controversial jurisdictional
theory first articulated in Seider v. Roth.41 Based initially on the
Harris concept that a debt travels with the debtor and may provide
the basis for obtaining quasi in rem jurisdiction over the creditor, 0
Seider constructed an ingenious method of permitting a state to
command a defendant to appear in its courts on the basis of his insurer
42. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
43. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). Shaffer involved a suit by a nonresident of Delaware
against other nonresidents of Delaware whose only contact with that state
consisted of holdings of stock in a Delaware corporation which had its principal
place of business in Arizona. The Delaware court sequestered this stock and
asserted quasi in rem jurisdiction. The suit arose out of events that occurred in
Oregon. Although the defendants participated in these events, they did so in
their capacities as officers and directors of the corporation and not as
stockholders. Thus, there was no relationship between the cause of action and
the sequestered stock. Id. at 213-14. In holding that attachment of the stock to
obtain jurisdiction denied the defendants' right to due process, the Court noted
that there was no relationship between the property forming the basis ofjurisdiction and the plaintiff's cause of action. This being the case, Delaware
had no contacts with the defendants that would satisfy the test of International
Shoe, which the Court held applicable to all forms of state jurisdiction. Id. at
212-17.
44. Id. at 212.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 208-09. Illustrative of another case in which the property serving as the
basis of jurisdiction is completely unrelated to the plaintiff's cause of action is
Harris. The Court noted that to the extent that such decisions are inconsistent
with the International Shoe standard, they are overruled. Id. at 212 n.39.
47. Id. at 209.
48. Id.
49. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
50. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
1980] 417
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doing business in that state." In Seider, the Court of Appeal of New
York held that the obligation of an insurance company to defend
and indemnify a nonresident tortfeasor constitutes a debt within the
meaning of New York's attachment statute and, as such, can be
attached for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendant.52 Seen as the most extreme form of quasi in
rem jurisdiction to date, Seider provoked a storm of comment, the
vast majority of which suggested that the decision was illogical as
well as unfair in practical application."
Simpson v. Loehmann-4 afforded the Court of Appeals of New York
its first opportunity to reconsider Seider in light of the argument
that the procedure sanctioned therein was offensive to due process.
Concluding that Seider presented no constitutional problems, the
court, relying on Harris, reasoned that the presence of the insurer's
debt in New York created a sufficient nexus between the state and
the defendant's interest in the policy to support jurisdiction.5 In
addition, the court maintained that the presence of both the plaintiff
and the insurance company in the forum gave the state "a
substantial and continuing relationship with the controversy"5 6 so as
to eliminate any due process problems. In order to avoid the harsh
effects of a New York statute,57 which would subject a defendant in a
Seider proceeding to in personam jurisdiction if he tried to contest
the attachment of his insurer's obligation, the court further held that
recovery by a plaintiff in a Seider proceeding would be limited to the
51. In Seider, New York residents brought suit against a resident of Canada for
damages allegedly sustained in an automobile accident which occurred in
Vermont. Pursuant to the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, New York
attached the defendant's insurance policy, issued through a company doing
business in New York, to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction. The statute provides
in pertinent part:
A money judgment may be enforced against any debt, which is past due
or which is yet to become due, certainly, or upon demand of the
judgment debtor, whether it was incurred within or without the state,
to or from a resident or nonresident, unless it is exempt from
application to the satisfaction of the judgment. A debt may consist of a
cause of action which could be assigned or transferred accruing within
or without the state.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5201(a) (McKinney 1978).
52. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 113-14, 216 N.E.2d 312, 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 101-02 (1966).
53. E.g., Reese, The Expanding Scope of Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents - New
York Goes Wild, 35 INS. COUNSEL J. 118 (1968); Rosenberg, One Procedural
Genie Too Many Or Putting Seider Back Into Its Bottle, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 660
(1971); Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and the
Interstate Corporation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 550 (1967).
54. 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 667, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).
55. Id. at 310, 234 N.E.2d at 671, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 636-37.
56. Id. at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
57. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 320(c) (McKinney Supp. 1966).
[Vol. 9
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face amount of the insurance policy, even if the defendant should
contest the matter on the merits."
Although the majority in Simpson clearly viewed Seider as an
exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction, implicit in the court's rationale
was the idea that Seider embraced not only a quasi in rem basis, but
also an in personam basis. Emphasizing the degree of control that
liability insurers exercise over litigation as well as the continuing
relationship New York has with the controversy when the plaintiff is
a resident and the insurer is present in and extensively regulated by
the state, Simpson seemed to suggest that Seider was really an in
personam action against the insurer. 9 Judge Keating, concurring in
Simpson, maintained that the Seider doctrine was, in effect, a
judicially created direct action statute against the insurer and could
be sustained on that basis alone.6 This alternative view of Seider
also found support in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. In Minichiello v. Rosenberg,61 Seider was found
acceptable as "in effect a judicially created direct action. '62 Viewed as
such, the Second Circuit believed that Watson v. Employer's Liability
58. 21 N.Y.2d 305, 310, 234 N.E.2d 667, 671, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 636-37 (1967).
This unexpected interpretation of New York law was promptly affirmed by the
legislature which revised the statute, § 320(c) of the New York Civil Practice
Law and Rules, to provide, in effect, that an insured does not submit to
personal jurisdiction by entering an appearance in a Seider proceeding. See
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 320(c) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
59. Chief Judge Fuld, writing for the majority in Simpson, stated:
Viewed realistically, the insurer in a case such as the present is in full
control of the litigation; it selects the defendant's attorneys; it decides if
and when to settle; and it makes all procedural decisions in connection
with the litigation. . . . Moreover, where the plaintiff is a resident of
the forum state and the insurer is present in and regulated by it, the
State has a substantial and continuing relation with the controversy.
For jurisdictional purposes, in assessing fairness under the due process
clause and in determining the public policy of New York, such factors
loom large.
21 N.Y.2d 305, 311, 234 N.E.2d 667, 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 637 (1967)
(citations omitted)
60. Reasoning that because New York could validly enact a direct action statute in
favor of its residents, Judge Keating argued that there was no policy reason for
not holding that "service of process on the real party defendant - the insurer
- is sufficient to compel it to defend in this State, provided it transacts
business here and is thus subject to the jurisdiction of our courts." Id. at
213-14, 234 N.E.2d at 673, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 639 (concurring opinion).
61. 410 F.2d 106, rehearing en banc, 410 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 844 (1969). The factual background of Minichiello is typical of the
Seider-type cases. The controversy arose out of an automobile accident which
occurred in Pennsylvania. The plaintiff was a resident of New York and
brought suit in that state. The defendant was a Pennsylvania resident insured
by Allstate Insurance Company, a corporation doing business in New York. Id.
at 107.
62. Id. at 109. On rehearing en banc, the Minichiello majority expressed the view
that Seider was constitutional so long as Harris was good law. Id. at 118.
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Assurance Corp.,63 a United States Supreme Court case which upheld
Louisiana's direct action statute, would be dispositive as to the issue
of Seider's constitutionality.6'
In Watson, the Supreme Court permitted a Louisiana resident to
sue a defendant's insurer directly, pursuant to that state's direct
action statute.65 The accident at issue had occurred in Louisiana.
Although the defective product which caused the damage was
manufactured in Illinois, it had been sold and used in Louisiana.
Against the claim that the statute violated the insurer's due process
rights, the Court ruled that application of Louisiana's law did not
violate due process because the state had a "legitimate interest" in
litigation over an accident occurring therein and in the protection of
parties injured within its bounds.6 1
The Minichiello court believed that similar interests of the State
of New York would support the judicially created direct action of
Seider. Notwithstanding the fact that the Louisiana direct action
statute, unlike the Seider procedure,' applied only to accidents
occurring in the state, 6 the court nonetheless concluded that the
United States Supreme Court would sustain the Seider doctrine.70
Therefore, two very distinct rationales emerged in support of the
constitutionality of the Seider doctrine: that it is an attachment
63. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
64. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 110, rehearing en bane, 410 F.2d 117
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969).
65. Louisiana's statute provides in part:
This right of direct action shall exist whether the policy of insurance
sued upon was written or delivered in the State of Louisiana or not and
whether or not such policy contains a provision forbidding such direct
action, provided the accident or injury occurred within the State of
Louisiana.
LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (West 1978).
66. 348 U.S. 66, 73 (1954).
67. Id. at 72. The Court described Louisiana's interest as follows:
Louisiana's direct action statute is not a mere intermeddling in
affairs beyond her boundaries which are no concern of hers. Persons
injured or killed in Louisiana are most likely to be Louisiana residents,
and even if not, Louisiana may have to care for them.. . . Louisiana
courts in most instances provide the most convenient forum for trial of
these cases.
Id.
68. The Seider procedure is only necessary when the accident occurred outside the
forum and the defendant is a nonresident. Otherwise, the defendant would be
subject to in personam jurisdiction.
69. See note 65 supra.
70. 410 F.2d 106, 110, rehearing en banc, 410 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 844 (1969). The court justified its position, stating:
While the burden on the insurer in trying a case in a state other than
the locus of the accident is heavier, there has been .. ."a movement
away from the bias favoring the defendant" in matters of personaljurisdiction "toward permitting the plaintiff to insist that the defendant
come to him" where there is a sufficient basis for doing so ....
Id. (quoting Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 181 (2d Cir. 1967)).
[Vol. 9
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device for purposes of quasi in rem jurisdiction over the defendant;
and that it is, in practical effect, a judicially created direct action
procedure allowing in personam jurisdiction over the defendant's
insurer.
Prior to Shaffer, few courts took issue with Seider's constitu-
tionality. Instead, most jurisdictions that considered the matter
rejected Seider on the basis of state law, holding that an insurer's
obligations do not constitute a res subject to attachment.7 Shaffer,
however, in overruling Harris, one of the major foundations of the
Simpson and Minichiello decisions, raised serious doubts as to
Seider's continued utility. The majority of commentators concluded
that Seider could not meet the minimum contacts requirement
prescribed by Shaffer.72
71. See Kirchman v. Mikula, 443 F.2d 816, 817 (5th Cir. 1971); Robinson v. O.F.
Shearer & Sons, 429 F.2d 83, 85-86 (3d Cir. 1970); Sykes v. Beal, 392 F. Supp.
1089, 1094-97 (D. Conn. 1975); Ricker v. LaJoie, 314 F. Supp. 401, 402-03 (D.
Vt. 1970); Javorek v. Superior Ct., 17 Cal. 3d 629, 641-45, 552 P.2d 728,
737-40, 131 Cal. Rptr. 768, 777-80 (1976); Hunt v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
345 So. 2d 1235, 1238 (La. App. 1977); Belcher v. Government Employees Ins.
Co., 282 Md. 718, 726, 387 A.2d 770, 773-74 (1978); State Gov't Employees Ins.
Co. v. Lasky, 454 S.W.2d 942, 950 (Mo. App. 1970); Hart v. Cote, 145 N.J.
Super. 420, 426, 367 A.2d 1219, 1222 (1976); Johnson v. Farmers Alliance Mut.
Ins. Co., 499 P.2d 1387, 1390 (Okla. 1972); Howard v. Allen, 254 S.C. 455,
458-62, 176 S.E.2d 127, 129-30 (1970).
72. Most commentators reasoned that assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant
in such cases is invalid, because sufficient contacts do not exist among the
state, the defendant, and the litigation as mandated by Shaffer. McLaughlin,
Seider v. Roth - Dead or Alive? N.Y.L.J., Dec. 9, 1977, at 1, col. 1; Zammit,
Reflections on Shaffer v. Heitner, 5 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 15, 20 (1978); Note,
Shaffer v. Heitner: Reshaping the Contours of State Court Jurisdiction, 11 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 87, 118 (1977); Note, Shaffer v. Heitner And The Seider Doctrine,
39 U. Prrr L. REV. 747, 768 (1978); See Comment, Quasi In Rem on the Heels of
Shaffer v. Heitner: If International Shoe Fits, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 485
(1977) (connection between forum and litigation too slight to support jurisdic-
tion); Comment, The Expanding Scope of the Sufficient Minimum Contacts
Standard: Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IowA L. REV. 504, 512 (1977) (insufficient
contacts on which to base jurisdiction); Note, Minimum Contacts Analysis
Extended to Assertions of In Rem Jurisdiction: Shaffer v. Heitner, 19 B.C. L.
REV. 772, 793-94 (1978) (litigation contact not established); Note, Shaffer v.
Heitner: The Supreme Court Established a Uniform Approach to State Court
Jurisdiction, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 131, 141 n.63 (1978) (intangibility of res
attached suggests insufficient contacts between owner and forum).
In addition, many argued that the defendant did not purposefully submit to
the forum's jurisdiction. Zammit, supra, at 20; Quasi In Rem on the Heels of
Shaffer v. Heitner, supra, at 484; Comment, Shaffer v. Heitner - If the
International Shoe Fits, Attach It, 31 RUTGERS L. REV. 308, 330 (1978);
Minimum Contacts Analysis Extended to Assertions of In Rem Jurisdiction,
supra, at 791-93; Note, The Supreme Court 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REV. 152,
158, 160 (1977); Note, Shaffer v. Heitner: New Constitutional Questions
Concerning Seider v. Roth, 6 HoFTRA L. REV. 393, 413 (1978); Reshaping the
Contours of State Court Jurisdiction, supra, at 108; Shaffer v. Heitner And The
Seider Doctrine, supra, at 763; Note, Shaffer v. Heitner: A New Attitude
Toward State Court Jurisdiction, 13 TULSA L.J. 82, 96 (1977).
Other criticisms included the potential of leaving defendants open to suit
in any of the fifty states, McLaughlin, supra, at 1, col. 1; New Constitutional
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Despite Shaffer's condemnation of jurisdiction based solely on
the presence of a defendant's property in the forum, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in O'Connor v.
Lee-Hy Paving Corp.,73 concluded that the Seider doctrine remained a
viable means of obtaining jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant.
The Second Circuit held that the attachment of an insurance policy
does not so offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice" as to violate due process.7 4 O'Connor met the argument that
the overruling of Harris was fatal to Seider, by distinguishing the
circumstances of Harris from the typical Seider fact pattern and by
stressing the insurer's contacts with the forum, as opposed to those of
the insured, in determining the fairness of the procedure.75
O'Connor characterized the Seider procedure as sui generis in
the field of jurisdiction,"' distinguishable as such from the quasi in
rem actions typified by Harris and proscribed by Shaffer, in which
jurisdiction is based on the attachment of property bearing no
relation to the cause of action.7  Unlike Harris, in which the
indebtedness on a personal loan attached for jurisdictional purposes
had no relation to the lender's separate debt to the plaintiff,78 the
insurance policy in a Seider proceeding is necessarily related to the
litigation because the specific purpose of the policy is to protect the
insured against the type of liability that is the subject of the
litigation.79
The Second Circuit believed that Shaffer's most important
mandate was that courts must look at realities and not become
absorbed in fictional concepts.' Based on that notion, the court
concluded that the insurer is the real party in interest in a Seider
Questions Concerning Seider v. Roth, supra, at 413, the "bootstrapping"
involved in attaching, to obtain jurisdiction, an obligation that does not mature
until jurisdiction has been obtained, see Reese, Shaffer v. Heitner: Implications
for the Doctrine of Seider v. Roth, 63 IOWA L. REV. 1023, 1025 (1977) (arguments
for attachability of obligations under insurance policy "highly conceptual and
hardly convincing"), and overemphasis in the Seider procedure of concern for
plaintiffs, Shaffer v. Heitner And The Seider Doctrine, supra, at 765-66; see
Note, Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice Expanded:
Shaffer v. Heitner, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 361, 371 (extending Seider, which
creates unfair hardships on nonresident defendants, ignores the fact that
Shaffer sought to remedy inequities).
73. 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978).
74. Id. at 198 n.4.
75. Id. at 198-200.
76. Id. at 202 n.11.
77. Id. at 199.
78. See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
79. 579 F.2d 194, 199 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978).
80. Id. at 200 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977)).
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proceeding. 81 Believing that the insurer's contacts with New York
would sustain in personam jurisdiction in a direct action against it,
O'Connor held that no reason existed for ruling the attachment of an
insurance policy invalid as a means of obtaining quasi in rem
jurisdiction.8 2
IV. RUSH v. SA VCHUK - DEMISE OF THE SEIDER DOCTRINE
In its determination that a state may not constitutionally
exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who
has no forum contacts by attaching the contractual obligation of an
insurer to defend and indemnify him in connection with the suit,
Rush v. Savchuk83 represents the final chapter in the Seider doctrine
saga. Similar in its facts to those of Seider and its progeny, Rush
arose out of a single-car accident in Indiana in which the plaintiff,
Savchuk, was injured while riding as a passenger in an automobile
operated by the defendant, Rush.8 Although both parties were
Indiana residents at the time of the occurrence, Savchuk later took
up residence in Minnesota and, some two years after the accident,
filed suit against Rush in Minnesota.85 As Rush had no contacts with
Minnesota that would support in personam jurisdiction there,
Savchuk attempted to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction pursuant to a
Minnesota statute, 6 which, in essence, codified the Seider
81. The Second Circuit reasoned that because the insurer's obligation to defend
essentially placed it in complete control of the litigation, and because thejudgment rendered for the plaintiff would be limited to the proceeds of the
insurance policy, the determination as to whether sustaining jurisdiction would
violate due process depended not upon the relations of the defendant to the
State of New York, but upon those between New York and the insurance
company. Id. at 200-01. The court conceded that the defendant in a Seider
proceeding would have no contacts with the forum. Id. at 198.
82. Id. at 201.
83. 100 S. Ct. 571 (1980).
84. Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 482, 245 N.W.2d 624, 626 (1976).
85. In Rush v. Savchuk, the Supreme Court noted that Savchuk's claim would have
been barred by Indiana's two year statute of limitations. 100 S. Ct. 571, 574 n.2
(1980) (citing Savchuk v. Rush (Savchuk II), 272 N.W.2d 888, 891 n.2 (Minn.
1978)). In addition, Indiana's guest statute would have precluded the action.
100 S. Ct. at 574.
86. The statute provides in relevant part:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein contained, a plaintiff
in any action in a court of record for the recovery of money may issue a
garnishee summons before judgment therein in the following instances
only:
(b) If the court shall order the issuance of such summons, if a
summons and complaint is filed with the appropriate court and either
served on the defendant or delivered to a sheriff for service on the
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procedure. 7 The trial court denied a motion by Rush and his insurer,
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., to dismiss the action
for lack of jurisdiction over the defendant.'
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Savchuk I,89
affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the obligation of
an insurer to defend and indemnify a nonresident defendant is a
garnishable res for jurisdictional purposes. Although it expressly
recognized that Rush had not engaged in any voluntary activity that
would justify an exercise of in personam jurisdiction, the court
concluded that considerations of fairness supported the exercise of
quasi in rem jurisdiction.' These considerations included the fact
that State Farm did business in Minnesota, that the insurer
controlled the defense in cases of accident litigation, and that
Minnesota had an interest in protecting its residents and providing
them with a forum in which to litigate their claims.9'
When Savchuk first appeared before the United States Supreme
Court, the Minnesota judgment was vacated, and the case was
remanded for further consideration in light of Shaffer.2 On remand,
however, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Savchuk II,93 remained
steadfast in its earlier ruling and held that Minnesota's Seider-type
procedure complied with the due process standards enunciated in
defendant not more than 30 days after the order is signed, and if, upon
application to the court it shall appear that:
(2) The purpose of the garnishment is to establish quasi in rem
jurisdiction and that ....
(b) defendant is a nonresident individual, or a foreign corporation,
partnership or association.
(3) The garnishee and the debtor are parties to a contract of
suretyship, guarantee, or insurance, because of which the garnishee
may be held to respond to any person for the claim asserted against the
debtor in the main action.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 571.41(2) (West Supp. 1978). The Minnesota Supreme Court
held that this statute embodies the rule stated in Seider. Savchuk v. Rush, 272
N.W.2d 888, 890 (Minn. 1978).
87. Savchuk, pursuant to the statute, garnished the obligation of Rush's insurer,
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., to defend and indemnify Rush.
State Farm was doing business in Minnesota. Rush was personally served in
Indiana. The complaint, alleging negligence, sought $125,000 in damages.
Rush v. Savchuk, 100 S. Ct. 571, 575 (1980). The prayer was later reduced
voluntarily to $50,000, the face amount of Rush's policy with State Farm. Id. at
575 n.5.
88. Id. at 575. In light of State Farm's response to the garnishment summons that
it did not owe the defendant anything, the trial court granted a motion by
Savchuk for permission to file a supplemental complaint making the garnishee,
State Farm, a party to the action. Id. at 574.
89. Savchuk v. Rush, 311 Minn. 480, 245 N.W.2d 624 (1976).
90. Id. at 487, 245 N.W.2d at 629.
91. Id.
92. See Savchuk v. Rush, 433 U.S. 902 (1977).
93. 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978).
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Shaffer.94 The court depreciated Shaffer's significance and distin-
guished it on its facts, noting that Minnesota's garnishment statute
differed from the Delaware stock sequestration procedure held
unconstitutional in Shaffer because the garnished res (the insurer's
obligations) in Savchuk was intimately related to the litigation. 5 As
was the case in O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp.,96 Savchuk H
side-stepped Shaffer's requirement that there be minimum contacts
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. Although Rush
himself had no contacts with Minnesota, the court attributed the
insurer's contacts to him by considering the "defending parties" as a
unit and aggregating their forum contacts to reach the conclusion
that jurisdiction was proper under Shaffer.97 Focusing on the
insurer's contacts, the plaintiffs interest in suing at home, and
Minnesota's interest in facilitating recoveries for its residents, the
court affirmed without reservation its earlier ruling in Savchuk 1.98
The United States Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the
majority in Rush, Justice Marshall found that Minnesota's exercise
of Seider-type jurisdiction did not comport with notions of due
process as measured by the minimum contacts standard." As in
Shaffer, the inquiry in Rush focused exclusively on "the relationship
among the defendant, the forum and the litigation,"1°° without
regard for the insurer's contacts or the interests of the plaintiff.1 1 In
considering the relationship between Rush and Minnesota, the fact
that Rush's insurer was doing business in that state was labelled an
"affiliating circumstance,"'12 not a contact, because the insurer's
decision to do business in Minnesota was "completely adventitious as
far as Rush was concerned. 0 3 Similarly, the presence of the
insurer's obligation to defend and indemnify Rush was found lacking
94. Id. at 893.
95. Id. at 891.
96. 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978).
97. The Minnesota Supreme Court considered the practical relationship between
the insurer and the defendant, the limitation of liability to the amount of the
policy, and the restriction of the garnishment procedure to resident plaintiffs
and concluded that the relationship among the "defending parties," the
litigation, and the forum state was sufficient to sustain the exercise of
jurisdiction. 272 N.W.2d 888, 892-93 (Minn. 1978).
98. 272 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1978).
99. 100 S. Ct. 571, 579-80 (1980).
100. Id. at 577.
101. Id. at 578-79.
102. Id. at 577.
103. Id. The Court noted that Rush had no control over State Farm's decision to do
business in Minnesota and that it was unlikely that he would have expected
that, by buying insurance in Indiana, he had subjected himself to suit in any
state to which a potential future plaintiff might decide to move. Id.
1980] 425 .
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in jurisdictional significance'0' in light of Shaffer's declaration that
the mere presence of property in the forum does not establish a
sufficient relationship between the owner of the property and the
state to support an exercise of jurisdiction. °5 Inasmuch as the
Minnesota courts had conceded that Rush had no contacts with the
state as would permit in personam jurisdiction"° and because the
accident at issue had occurred in Indiana, the Court concluded that
Rush had engaged in no "purposeful activity related to the forum
that would make the exercise of jurisdiction fair, just or
reasonable."' 7
The Court also found that there was no significant link between
the litigation and the forum. Although the Minnesota Supreme
Court had viewed the insurance policy as so important to the
litigation that it provided sufficient contacts to satisfy due process, l0"
Justice Marshall indicated that such a focus on insurance was
misplaced because the insurance agreement was not the subject
matter of the litigation nor was it in any way related to the
operative facts of the negligence action.'09 Given that the contractual
arrangements between the defendant and the insurer pertained to
the conduct, not the substance of the litigation, insurance had no
jurisdictional significance absent any contacts between the forum
and the defendant."0
The alternative view of Seider-type jurisdiction, which attri-
butes the insurer's forum contacts to the defendant by treating the
attachment procedure as, in effect, a direct action against the
insurer, was viewed with equal disdain by the Court. In support of
its conclusion that "Seider actions are not equivalent to direct
actions,""' the Court noted that the state's ability to exert its
authority over the insured defendant is "analytically prerequisite to
the insurer's entry into the case as a garnishee.""' 2 If due process
prohibits jurisdiction over the insured defendant on the basis of his
104. The Court did not consider whether an insurer's obligation to its insured is a
garnishable res, noting that such a determination is a matter of state law.
Proceeding on the assumption that it is garnishable, the Court focused on the
significance of the insurer's obligation to the relationship among the defendant,
the forum, and the litigation. Id. at 577 n.14.
105. Id. at 577.
106. Id. at 575.
107. Id. at 577-78.
108. Id. at 578. In Savchuk II, the court explained that "the insurer's obligation to
defend and indemnify, while theoretically separable from the tort action, has
no independent value or significance apart from accident litigation." 272
N.W.2d 888, 892 (Minn. 1978) (emphasis in original). The court believed that
the insurance was really the focus of the litigation. Id.






insurance policy, then there is no reason or basis for bringing the
garnishee into the action. Thus, the Court reasoned, the question of
jurisdiction over the nonresident insured cannot be avoided because
the party with the forum contacts (the insurer) can only be reached
through the nonresident."'
Rush also condemned the attempt in Savchuk 11 to view the
"defending parties" as a unit in order to exercise jurisdiction over
Rush based solely on the activities of State Farm.' Although the
parties' relationship with each other may be significant in evaluat-
ing their ties with the forum, the Court posited that the minimum
contacts requirement must be met as to each individual defendant
over whom a state court exercises jurisdiction."'
V. ANALYSIS
A. Immediate Implications of Rush
The Court's decision in Rush eliminates any doubt as to the
continued vitality of the Seider doctrine, making it clear that neither
rationale offered in its support satisfies the requirements of due
process enunciated by the Court. Although Rush is factually
distinguishable from Seider and its progeny in that the plaintiff in
Rush was not a resident of the forum state at the time the cause of
action arose,116 the Court took no note of this distinction in reaching
its holding."7 Focusing only on those facts which Rush shares in
113. Id. at 579. The Court cited with approval its decision in Watson v. Employer's
Liability Assurance Corp., see text accompanying notes 65-67 supra, noting
that the direct action statute upheld in Watson, which permitted the plaintiff to
sue the insurer without naming the insured as a defendant, was applicable only
if the accident or injury occurred in the forum state or the insured party was
domiciled there. Id. at 579 n.19.
114. Id. at 579.
115. Id.
116. The Second Circuit, in O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1034 (1978), observed that Savchuk I presented a forum
shopping problem because the plaintiff was not a resident of Minnesota at the
time of the accident. Noting that New York had refused to allow nonresident
plaintiffs to use Seider jurisdiction, see Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, 411 F.2d
812, 817 (2d Cir. 1967), O'Connor suggested that the Supreme Court could
reverse Savchuk without adversely affecting the Seider doctrine. 579 F.2d at
199 n.6.
117. The Court did note that the decisions limiting Seider jurisdiction to actions by
forum residents are demonstrative of what the Court viewed as the Seider
doctrine's most objectionable attribute, that is, the shift in focus from the
defendant to the plaintiff such that the plaintiff's contacts with the forum are
decisive in determining whether the defendant's due process rights are
violated. Such an approach, the Court concluded, is forbidden by International
Shoe and its progeny. 100 S. Ct. 571, 579 (1980).
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common with all of the Seider cases,"' the Court's analysis applies
with equal vigor to any case of Seider jurisdiction and leaves no
basis on which to distinguish Rush and thereby circumvent its
holding in the future.119
In condemning Seider jurisdiction, the Court found it unneces-
sary to express its view of the propriety of treating an insurer's
obligations to its insured as a garnishable res.12 ° Although the Court
deemed the issue a question of state law,121 its holding, as a practical
matter, precludes further use of such a procedure. 2 As noted earlier,
Rush requires minimum contacts among the insured, the forum, and
the litigation before jurisdiction can be asserted over the nonresident
insured, notwithstanding the presence of his insurer in the forum.
Consequently, it is difficult to envision a situation in which a
plaintiff would prefer to invoke quasi in rem jurisdiction on the basis
of an insurance policy rather than in personam jurisdiction, because
the same contacts are required in either proceeding. 123 Thus, without
prohibiting the garnishment of an insurer's obligations, Rush
practically guarantees that such a procedure will never surface
again, at least in a jurisdictional context.
In light of Shaffer's mandate that all assertions of state
jurisdiction require minimum contacts, the conclusion in Rush that
the mere presence of the insurer is insufficient contact between the
nonresident and the forum was inescapable. The Court's terse
dismissal of Seider insofar as it embodied the concept of direct action
against insurers, on the other hand, is not quite so persuasive. In
their dissenting opinions, Justices Stevens and Brennan suggested
that the Court's only apparent reason for rejecting Seider's alterna-
tive basis was the mere fact that the insured defendant was a
nominal party to the suit.124 Citing Watson v. Employer's Liability
Assurance Corp., which upheld Louisiana's direct action statute,'125
118. Rush is typical of other Seider-type cases by virtue of the common denominator
of a forum state attempting to assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
for the purpose of adjudicating a claim that arose outside the forum state,
solely on the basis of the nonresident's insurer doing business in the forum.
119. See Davilla v. O'Connor, No. 79-4168 (S.D.N.Y., May 16, 1980) (Rush
precludes further use of Seider jurisdiction).
120. Most states rejecting the Seider doctrine did so on the basis of a reluctance to
treat the insurer's obligations as a res subject to garnishment. See note 71
supra.
121. 100 S. Ct. 571, 577 n.14 (1980).
122. The Court noted that only three states, New York, New Hampshire, and
Minnesota, had used the attachment or garnishment procedure to effectjurisdiction over a nonresident. Id. at 576. Rush eliminates the utility of this
procedure in those states and insures that no other states will permit the
garnishment or attachment of insurance obligations in a jurisdictional context.
123. See note 68 supra.
124. 100 S. Ct. 571, 580 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 583 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
125. 348 U.S. 66 (1954). See text accompanying notes 65-67 supra.
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the dissents maintained that the Court in Rush could and should
have ignored the technicality of the insured being a nominal party
inasmuch as the real impact of the suit was on the insurer. 2' If the
Court's only reservation about Seider-type direct actions is that the
insured is named as a party to the action, the question becomes
whether the Court would sustain a legislatively enacted direct action
statute applied to a case such as Seider or Rush in which the cause of
action arises outside the forum state and the tortfeasor is a
nonresident. For reasons to be discussed, the conclusion that must be
drawn from Rush is that a direct action statute against insurers
would be unconstitutional as applied to the typical Seider-type
factual scenario, even though the nonresident tortfeasor would not
be a party to the action.
B. Direct Actions Against Insurers
Although the Supreme Court upheld a direct action against an
insurance company in Watson, its holding in that case cannot be
viewed as authority for sanctioning the procedure envisioned by the
application of a direct action statute in a Seider-type setting,
especially in light of the narrowly drafted Louisiana statute at issue
in Watson.127 Unlike a direct action in a Seider situation, the
Louisiana statute only applied to accidents which occurred in that
state.1 8 In essence, the direct action against the insurer in Watson
126. Justice Stevens wrote:
I believe such a direct action statute is valid as applied to a suit brought
by a forum resident . .., even if the accident giving rise to the action
did not occur in the forum State . . ., so long as it is understood that
the forum may exercise no power whatsoever over the individual
defendant. As so understood it makes no difference whether the
insurance company is sued in its own name or, as Minnesota law
provides, in the guise of a suit against the individual defendant.
100 S. Ct. 571, 580 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice
Brennan wrote:
The real impact on the named defendant is the same as it is in a direct
action against the insurer, which would be constitutionally permissi-
ble .... The only distinction is the formal, "analytical prerequisite,"
... of making the insured a named party. Surely the mere addition of
appellant's name to the complaint does not suffice to create a due
process violation.
Id. at 583 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
127. See note 65 supra.
128. Id. Wisconsin has a similar direct action statute which provides in pertinent
part:
In any action for damages caused by negligence, any insurer which has
an interest in the outcome of such controversy adverse to the plaintiff or
any of the parties to such controversy, or which by its policy of
insurance assumes or reserves the right to control the prosecution,
defense or settlement of the claim or action, or which by its policy
agrees to prosecute or defend the action brought by plaintiff or any of
the parties to such action, or agrees to engage counsel to prosecute or
defend said action or agrees to pay the costs of such litigation, is by this
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was but a convenient substitute for an action against the nonresi-
dent tortfeasor who, in the absence of a direct action statute, could
have been sued in personam in Louisiana anyway." 9 Louisiana's
statute was therefore not a superficial attempt by the forum to
circumvent the due process limitations on jurisdiction over nonresi-
dents. As the Court observed, "Louisiana's direct action statute is
not a mere intermeddling in affairs beyond her boundaries which are
no concern of hers."'30 Quite to the contrary, the application of a
direct action statute in a Seider case would provide a state with a
means of obtaining jurisdiction over matters which it would not
otherwise have authority to adjudicate.' Despite the contentions of
Justices Stevens and Brennan,'32 Watson is hardly clear and
convincing authority for sustaining a direct action statute in cases in
which the controversy at issue occurred outside the forum state and
the tortfeasor is not otherwise subject to jurisdiction. If anything,
Watson's emphasis on Louisiana's interest in accidents occurring
within its borders, 33 implicitly suggests that a direct action in a
Seider-type case is unconstitutional.3 4
section made a proper party defendant in any action brought by
plaintiff in this state on account of any claim against the insured. If the
policy of insurance was issued or delivered outside this state, the insurer
is by this paragraph made a proper party defendant only if the accident,
injury or negligence occurred in this state.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 803.04(2)(a) (West 1977) (emphasis added).
129. In Watson, plaintiffs, Louisiana residents, were injured by a product which had
been purchased and used in Louisiana, but which had been manufactured in
Illinois. 348 U.S. 66, 67 (1954). Although the Court did not explicitly consider
minimum contacts, it is clear that the Illinois corporation was subject to in
personam jurisdiction in Louisiana under the International Shoe standard. By
selling its products in Louisiana, the Illinois corporation had purposefully
availed itself of the benefits and privileges of Louisiana's laws, thereby
establishing contacts between itself and Louisiana. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 253 (1958). See text accompanying notes 35 & 36 supra. Contacts
between the forum and the litigation lie in the fact that the accident and injury
had occurred in the forum. See Rush v. Savchuk, 100 S. Ct. 571, 578 (1980). As
there was a relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation,
the nonresident tortfeasor in Watson would have been subject to the
adjudicatory authority of Louisiana's courts. LA. CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. § 13:3201
(West 1965 & Supp. 1980).
130. 348 U.S. 66, 72 (1954).
131. In the absence of a Seider-type direct action statute, the forum would have no
jurisdiction over the nonresident tortfeasor- because of the lack of contacts
between the nonresident tortfeasor and the forum and between the forum and
the litigation. See Rush v. Savchuk, 100 S. Ct. 571, 577-78 (1980).
132. See note 126 supra.
133. 348 U.S. 66, 72 (1954).
134. As indicated by its note pointing out the distinguishing features of Watson, the
Court in Rush seemed to feel that Watson was not dispositive of a Seider-type




For a direct action statute to withstand constitutional scrutiny
in the context of a Seider-type factual setting, the criteria estab-
lished in International Shoe and its progeny must be satisfied.3 5
That is to say, there must be minimum contacts among the
defendant (insurer), the forum, and the litigation (the resident
plaintiff's cause of action against the nonresident tortfeasor), such
that maintenance of the direct action does not offend "notions of fair
play and substantial justice."'' 6 Establishing a nexus between the
insurer and the forum poses little difficulty. Under the standard
articulated in Hanson v. Denckla,137 the insurer's contacts with the
forum lie in the fact that the insurer, by maintaining an office and
conducting business in the forum, has purposefully availed itself of
the benefits and protections of the forum's laws. 3' It is therefore
reasonable to require the insurer to respond to a suit brought in the
forum when the suit relates to activities of the insurer within that
state. "'39 The problem with a direct action in a Seider-type case is that
there is no relationship between the controversy and the forum. The
accident or cause of action which forms the basis of the plaintiff's
claim against the insurer takes place outside the forum state and the
tortfeasor is a nonresident over whom the forum has no personal
jurisdiction. Despite the insurer's contact with the forum, Rush
made it clear that the subject matter of the litigation is the
out-of-state accident, not the activities of the resident insurer.14 0 Just
as the mere presence of a defendant's property is an insufficient
basis of jurisdiction in the wake of Shaffer, the mere presence of the
insurer, without more, should be deemed inadequate to uphold
jurisdiction in a direct action, in view of the Court's emphasis in
Shaffer and Rush on contacts among the forum, the defendant, and
the litigation.'14 Although the forum's interest in regulating insurers
and providing a means of redress for its injured residents parallels
the state interests given recognition in Watson 42 and McGee v.
135. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
136. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
137. 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
138. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
139. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
140. 100 S. Ct. 571, 578 (1980).
141. See Woods, Pennoyer's Demise: Personal Jurisdiction After Shaffer and Kulko
and a Modest Prediction Regarding World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
20 ARIZ. L. REV. 861, 865 (1978) (Shaffer prohibits jurisdiction based upon mere
physical presence of the defendant). Accord, Werner, Dropping the Other Shoe:
Shaffer v. Heitner and the Demise of Presence-Oriented Jurisdiction, 45
BROOKLYN L. REV. 565, 587-97 (1978).
142. 348 U.S. 66, 72 (1954) (Louisiana has a valid interest in providing remedies for
its residents who are injured in that state).
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International Life Insurance Co.,14 3 the Court noted in Rush that such
interests will not take the place of contacts and are only relevant to
the final determination of fairness once the requisite minimum
contacts have been found to exist.1 44 Given the Court's obvious
distaste for the Seider doctrine as expressed in Rush, it appears
likely that a direct action statute applied in a Seider-type case will
be held unconstitutional on the basis of the lack of any relationship
between the forum and the litigation.
2. Fairness
While minimum contacts have been the primary focus of the
Court's decisions since International Shoe, the emphasis on "fair
play" and "substantial justice" indicates that the ultimate due
process consideration is whether a particular exercise of jurisdiction
is fair and reasonable in light of the facts of the particular case.4 4 In
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,146 an in personam case
decided on the same day as Rush, the Court discussed the concept of
fairness and explained that the terms "fairness" and "reasonable-
ness" are merely convenient ways of referring to the guarantee
embodied in the due process clause against inconvenient litigation. 47
Hence, the primary concern in assessing fairness is the burden
placed on the defendant in having to litigate in the chosen forum.14 8
Other relevant factors are weighed against that consideration, such
as the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the
plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, and
the shared interest of the interstate judicial system in obtaining
litigational efficiency.1 49
143. 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (California has a manifest interest in regulating
insurers and providing effective means of redress for its residents when their
insurers refuse to pay claims).
144. 100 S. Ct. 571, 579 (1980).
145. See Woods, Pennoyer's Demise: Personal Jurisdiction After Shaffer and Kulko
and a Modest Prediction Regarding World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
20 ARIz. L. REV. 861, 861-62 (1978).
146. 100 S. Ct. 559 (1980). In World-Wide, plaintiffs instituted a products-liability
action in Oklahoma for personal injuries sustained in Oklahoma in an accident
involving an automobile that had been purchased by them in New York while
they were New York residents. The defendants included the automobile
retailer and its wholesaler, New York corporations that did no business in
Oklahoma. The defendants claimed that Oklahoma's exercise of jurisdiction
over them would offend due process. The United States Supreme Court held
that Oklahoma was without jurisdiction because there was no contact between
the forum and the automobile retailer and wholesaler inasmuch as it could not
be shown that those defendants conducted any purposeful activity in Okla-
homa.





In McGee, the Court considered some of these factors in reaching
its conclusion that California's exercise of jurisdiction over a Texas
insurance company comported with notions of fairness because
California provided the most effective and convenient forum.1 5° The
Court attached significance to the interest of the forum in providing
effective means of redress for its residents and the interest of the
plaintiff in obtaining convenient relief,'," but found dispositive the
fact that all of the crucial witnesses in the case, including the
plaintiff, were located in California.' Although the Court conceded
that defending the action in California might be an inconvenience, it
indicated that any burdens incumbent upon the Texas defendant
paled in comparison to the overall efficiency and convenience of
trying the case in that forum."
Application of the McGee analysis to a direct action in a
Seider-type case leads to the inescapable conclusion that jurisdiction
in the plaintiff's forum is unfair. First, the burden on the insurer in
a direct action is a heavy one because all of the witnesses that may
be crucial to its case, including the insured tortfeasor, will be located
outside the forum state where the availability of adequate process to
secure them is questionable. Second, the interests of the plaintiff and
the forum in a Seider-type case do little to offset the burden upon the
defendant. In McGee, the forum's interest was substantial because
the activity of the Texas insurer, which formed the basis of the
plaintiff's claim, took place in California. The insurer's forum
activity in a Seider-type case, contrary to the situation in McGee, is
unrelated to the subject matter of the controversy. The plaintiff's
interest in suing at home was also of considerably more significance
in McGee because the insurer solicited an insurance policy in
California and accepted premiums mailed from that state. In a
Seider-type case, the plaintiff's interest in bringing the action in his
own forum is substantially diminished by the fact that the con-
troversy arose outside the forum and did not involve the defendant-
insurer. Finally, the considerations of convenience and efficiency
emphasized by the Court in McGee militate against a direct action in
the plaintiff's forum in a Seider-type case. As noted above, most if
not all of the crucial witnesses as well as the tortfeasor will be
located outside the forum. Therefore, unlike McGee, considerations of
litigational efficiency and convenience do not weigh in favor of a
direct action, but instead are synonymous with the interest of the
defendant in avoiding inconvenient litigation. A direct action in a
Seider-type case, while convenient to the plaintiff, does not serve the
150. 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957).
151. Id. at 223.
152. Id. at 223-24.
153. Id. at 224.
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ends of justice and fair play which are the purposes of the due
process clause.
VI. CONCLUSION
Over a decade after its emergence, the controversial Seider
doctrine, which permitted a state to exercise jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant solely on the basis of his insurer doing
business in that state, has been declared unconstitutional as applied
to defendants who have no contact with the forum. The Supreme
Court's condemnation of the Seider doctrine in Rush is consistent
with its prior decisions, particularly Shaffer, which prohibited
jurisdiction based on the mere presence of a defendant's property in
the forum. Moreover, Rush underscores the unwillingness expressed
by the Court in Shaffer to become absorbed in fictional concepts
when analyzing a defendant's relationship to a particular forum.
Because the Court did not consider the viability of a legislatively
mandated direct action in the context of a Seider-type case, it is
questionable whether such a procedure will survive Rush. Unless
the Court wishes to exalt form over substance, however, it is clear
that such a direct action should be found unconstitutional on the
basis of the lack of any relationship between the forum and the
controversy and because of the overall unfairness engendered by
such a procedure.
Albert J. Mezzanotte, Jr.
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